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They came to our village and us that there would be a wonderful new development that would bring us
schools and more ﬁsh and shillings and a better life. We said that we heard about the dam and that the lake
would go down and that we cannot lose our ﬁsh who mostly are at the shore. We don’t want the dam. They
said that we were wrong and that the dam would be good for us. Then they went away. We do not know
what they did after that.
[Turkana man in shoreline village following AFDB consultants’ visit]
Abstract
The common interests of the Ethiopian government, international development banks and
global consulting ﬁrms in promoting, implementing and legitimizing the Gibe III dam and
its associated development are starkly apparent in environmental and socioeconomic
studies and impact assessments. None of them address the actual impact area of the Gibe III
dam project—namely, one including human and environmental effects of the project in the
tri-nation Ethiopia/Kenya/South Sudan transboundary region. The Ethiopian government
(GOE) downstream impact assessment is invalidated by its major omissions, misrepresen-
tations, and fabrications. These failings include false assertions of ‘disastrous’ Omo River
floods ‘requiring’ river regulation floods which do not occur; misrepresentations of Omo
basin environmental hydrology and socioeconomy; and exclusion of the impacts of Gibe III
dependent, large-scale irrigated agriculture. Global consulting industry assessments of the
dam commissioned by the European Investment Bank and African Development Bank
(AFDB) do not signiﬁcantly challenge GOE failings. Instead they offer primarily
‘suggestions’ for future consideration, rather than the identiﬁcation of analysis that must
be conducted before approval of any impact assessment. They pave the way for the World
Bank and AFDB to violate their own human rights protocols by funding an infrastructure to
allow Ethiopia to export hydrodam generated electricity.
Launching the Gibe III Dam—And a System of Bias
Any environmental consequence has to be recognized early and taken into account in project design. (GOE 2009b)
This statement by the Ethiopian government is directly at odds with the its apparent predetermined decision that
contracting and initiation of construction of the Gibe III dam could disregard the funding procedures and safeguard
requirements of international aid organizations, that the Gibe III dam would be built whatever the cost to the
livelihoods of the nation’s own indigenous population, and that any impact assessments produced during construction
would basically endorse, or legitimize the project.
➢ The most common statements of ‘justiﬁcation’ for the more than $1.7 billion Gibe III project that have been issued
have been the “need for electricity” by the Ethiopian population—including its poorest elements—and the ‘urgency’
for regulation of an allegedly “uncontrolled” and “disastrous” Omo River. These have been repeatedly issued by the
GOE (including by the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce, EEPCO ofﬁcials and Ministers) and by development agencies involved in
various stages of the project. Both statements are based on false premises. In the ﬁrst instance, a high proportion of Gibe III
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power generation has been slated for export since the inception of planning. Moreover, the cost of electricity would
inevitably be far too high for a vast proportion of the population. In the second, no such ‘disastrous’ floods exist. These
issues are detailed below.
• As with the Gibe I and Gibe II projects, the GOE awarded a no-bid, ‘turn-key’ contract for Gibe III construction
to its long-term global associate, Salini Costruttori—exempting the ﬁrm from any oversight. The GOE (with Salini)
contracted two Italian-based global consulting ﬁrms for environmental and socioeconomic impact assessments. Both
reports were produced in 2009. They are described below as so fundamentally flawed that they must be considered
unacceptable—or invalid.
• The Ethiopian government began its construction of the Gibe III dam construction at the beginning of 2007—
more than two years prior to environmental or socioeconomic impact assessment. This action was in clear violation
of its own laws and procedures as well as those of the international development banks from which it was to seek
funding. Chapter 2 outlined the political and economic context for river basin development in prior decades within the
country, including as a lead-up to the Gibe III project.
The GOE/Salini initiation of construction and after-the-fact impact assessments were done without oversight by its
alleged regulatory agency, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)—a new agency formed under advice from
international aid agencies. Directly responsible to the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce, under whose auspices the project had been
initiated, the Authority was incapable of an ‘independent’ evaluation. The EPA later stated that it had ‘approved’ the project
and repeated the Executive Ofﬁce’s insistence that the Gibe III dam is a matter of “national priority” and “urgency”.
➢ GOE violations of required procedures notwithstanding, the GOE requested funding from the European Investment
Bank, the World Bank and the African Development Bank for its approximately USD 1.7 billion project. Despite their
long-term and comprehensive support of such developments (see Chap. 2), the GOE’s violation of their required procedures
for consideration of funding placed the banks in a difﬁcult position. The situation was particularly problematic since the
Gibe III dam was designed as an important ﬁrst phase of plans for an East Africa-wide energy network and industrial
development program.
The banks continued with their means of supporting the dam, however, in multiple ways:
• Support for GOE infrastructure projects.
• Funding of Ethiopian executive and administrative agencies, including EEPCO which is directly in charge of the project.
• ‘Direct funding’ for “protection of basic services”—a highly fungible type of funding that is directed to the lower Omo
basin, among other areas of Ethiopia.
• Funding for construction of a major transmission line (primarily by the World Bank and the AFDB) for electricity export
from Ethiopia to Kenya as part of the initiation of a multi-billion dollar ‘energy highway’ system for eastern Africa, the
EAPP. Despite declaimers The Gibe III would clearly contribute to this power export system.
The transmission line—in handling electricity from the overwhelmingly largest source of power in the Ethiopian
region—the Gibe III dam—has cumulative effects with the hydrodam and therefore must be included in any impact
assessment, including of the transmission line itself. No such comprehensive assessment was produced by the
development banks, nor by the GOE.
➢ EEPCO released the reports from both contracted ﬁrms in 2009. The agency released an ESIA for the dam ‘project
area’ in January of that year: “Gibe III Hydroelectric Project, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment” (GOE
2009a). This report was prepared by the Italy based global consulting ﬁrms, Centro Electrotecnico Sperimentale Italiano S.p.
A (CESI)/Mid-Day International Consulting Engineers—companies with longstanding connections to both the GOE and
Salini. ‘Scoping’ stipulations in CESI’s contract, however, limited this environmental and socioeconomic impact assessment
(ESIA) to the area proximal to the dam and the ‘impound area’ for the reservoir. This GOE assessment effectively dismissed
the possibility of serious downstream environmental and social concerns as a consequence of the Gibe III dam.
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A few of the GOE’s caveat statements in its assessment are sufﬁcient to demonstrate its disregard for the downriver impacts
of the dam—certainly for the hundreds of thousands of indigenous people residing there, as well as their environs:
• There will be ‘negligible impact’ on livelihood bases of the population.
• There are no tribal people in the project area whose traditional lifestyles could become compromised through the
implementation of the proposed hydropower project.
• No adverse direct or indirect impacts are anticipated in respect of sensitive habitats.
A second ESIA for the ‘downstream zone’ from the Gibe III dam was released by the GOE later in 2009. This
assessment is one with extensive major omissions, misrepresentations and fabrications, the dimensions of which are
indicated in Fig. 6.1. Another global consulting ﬁrm—Agriconsulting of Italy, in association with MDI Consulting
Engineers—prepared this assessment, entitled Gibe III Hydroelectric Project: Environmental Impact Assessment—Addi-
tional Study on Downstream Impact (GOE 2009b).1
The omissions, misrepresentations and fabrications indicated in the ﬁgure apply to both baseline and ‘empirical’ information
presented and are detailed in the sections below. They include, for example, the exclusions or gross distortion of:
• The transboundary character of the Gibe III’s impact system, including not only the lower Omo River basin but Kenya’s
Lake Turkana region, and the contested Ilemi Triangle Region with the extreme southeastern portion of South Sudan.
• Major seismic issues in the Gibe III dam region, including plausible catastrophic destruction from earthquake and
landslide events.
• Fundamental hydrologic characteristics of the region, especially the Omo River’s flow volume and Omo River inflow to
Lake Turkana—and the impacts of their radical reduction from the effects of the Gibe III dam and the large-scale irrigated
agricultural systems planned, the characteristics of multiple watercourses in the lower basin, and the nature of Omo River
flooding patterns.
• Hydrologic patterns of Lake Turkana and critical freshwater inflow from the Omo River.
• Livelihood systems of pastoral, agropastoral and ﬁshing ethnic groups within the lower Omo River basin and around
central and northern Lake Turkana: their customary resource tenure patterns, present economic status, and vulnerability
to radical destruction of their survival systems from river and lake reduction by the Gibe III dam.
The Myth of Flood ‘Disasters’ as Rationale for Megadam Development
The crisis confronting hundreds of thousands of indigenous peoples struggling to survive along the Omo River and the
shorelines of Lake Turkana is too little flooding, not excessive flooding.
➢ The rush to rationalize the proposed Gibe III dam was starkly evident in the Ethiopian government’s reports of
‘catastrophic losses of human life and property (livestock, particularly) from an alleged Omo River flood “disaster”
in August of 2006. The GOE’s numerous reports and requests for international ﬁnancial and material aid ‘for relief efforts’
repeatedly declared that at least 350–1000 people had drowned (depending on the speciﬁc report) and at least 3000–4000
livestock had been swept away. Hundreds of press releases and declarations from the GOE’s information permeated African
and international media.
The GOE has continually asserted that the “catastrophic losses” of 2006 were just the most recent of such events from the
Omo River’s alleged “excessive” and “destructive” flooding with repeated “major losses” of human life and livestock. Based
on this fallacious assumption and the complicity of international development agencies and investing corporations, the GOE
proceeded with the clear assumption that the Omo River must be regulated, and that this would occur through Africa’s
largest hydrodam, the Gibe III. As stated above, construction of Gibe III infrastructure was already underway in 2006,
without any impact assessment.
1Unless otherwise speciﬁed, references to the GOE’s environmental and socioeconomic impact assessment (ESIA) refer to the GOE’s downstream
impact assessment (GOE 2009b).
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Fig. 6.1 Dimensions of invalidity in the Ethiopian government’s downstream impact assessment of the Gibe III dam
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The GOE’s false assertion of disastrous flooding caused by the Omo River is accompanied by its equally false
assertion of ‘excessive evaporation’ occurring broadly in the region from alleged standing water following overbank
flooding in broad plains adjacent to the river—with ‘lost waters’ that would be recovered following Gibe III dam
construction. Two related assertions repeatedly made by the GOE are false.
• Firstly, regulation of the Omo River is necessary, making the Gibe III dam an imperative. In fact, no such disastrous
floods have occurred, so there is no ‘imperative’ for major dam construction.
• Secondly, the Gibe III dam “will provide recovery” of “lost waters” from excessive flooding—‘compensating’ for the
radical reduction of Omo River flow volume caused by the dam. In fact, only relatively small isolated pockets of standing
water occur, including from seasonal rainy periods.2
The GOE maintained strict control over the reporting of the alleged flood disaster and information available to represen-
tatives from a host of national governments, international relief and development agencies, and private foundations per-
sonnel visiting the region. Visitors were situated in Omorate (where the police station and some other structures in the
20-year-old frontier town were flooded)—tens of kilometers upstream from the alleged devastation—where they were
instructed by the GOE in the ‘gravity of the crisis’ and the ‘urgent need’ for substantial funds and supplies from international
donors. For some, fly-overs were arranged for an aerial view of what were, in fact, swollen waters in the active Omo delta
region and the Omo River’s terminus at Lake Turkana.3 Inquiring visitors were told that the absence of visible dead bodies
could be explained by the ‘fact’ that they had floated down the river and into Kenya’s Lake Turkana. No explanation was
offered for the absence of reports of such dead bodies or carcasses around Lake Turkana.
Hundreds of media reports repeated the same GOE ‘news’—with no tolerance of dissenting views. In fact, when an
Ethiopian non-governmental organization based in the Omo delta region publicly stated the absence of human life loss, it
was quickly removed from the region and its agricultural aid work was discontinued.
The GOE’s misrepresentation of the Omo’s annual flood rests on its false assumption that massive flood waters spread
throughout the plains extending east and west from the river, and upstream from the modern Omo delta.
➢ There was no calamitous flood in 2006—nor have there been ‘repeated disastrous floods,’ as overbank flooding by the
Omo River occurs only within the active (modern) delta and along the delta’s northernmost limit. This fact is
repeatedly misrepresented by the GOE in its general statements as well as its environmental impact assessments. The
absence of such flooding is clear from both abundant satellite data and accounts by indigenous community leaders
throughout the so-called ‘flood disaster zone’.
Omo flooding does not occur in what are in fact relict, or ancient, floodplains lateral to the river upstream from the active
delta. ARWG physical scientists estimate these relict floodplains to be at least 10,000 years old. Dasanech elders also
reported that according to their oral history, these lands have not flooded in recent memory. General ﬁeld observation and
detailed ﬁeld-based studies of soil and vegetation characteristics in these broad relict floodplains—including by this writer
and other ARWG researchers—have yielded no evidence of overbank flooding.4
Large portions of the Omo delta have emergent vegetation that appears in satellite photos during the highest portion of the
flood. The ‘submerged island’ described in multiple Ethiopian press releases is an area that was emergent only in recent
years, as the delta has expanded into Kenya’s Lake Turkana. Its elevation is about 363 m, so it would normally be flooded
2The flooding apparent in the highly saline depression of Sanderson’s Gulf (see Chap. 7 maps) indicated in the USDA satellite photos—is most
likely from an ephemeral watercourse, the Kibish River—(see Fig. 1.1). Alternatively, a backup of water from the Omo’s terminus could have
produced these waters.
3The Ethiopian head of state, the late Meles Zenawi, made a high proﬁle ‘stop-over’ in the delta region, underscoring the GOE’s reports of
‘calamity’ in the region.
4Overbank flooding is a distinctly different phenomenon from small breaks in the natural levee at a few points, allowing movement of Omo waters
at flood stage into small locales here and there behind the levee. This writer has spent weeks in these flats conducting soil and vegetation transects,
as well as conducted helicopter reconnaissance throughout the region.
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when the lake reaches that elevation. Rather than spreading beyond the active Omo delta, the flood extended only into the
northern edges of the active delta and the basin-like depression west of the Omo River, known as Sanderson’s Gulf (referred
to as berar by the Dasanech). The U.S. Department of Agriculture satellite photos (Fig. 6.2) substantiate this assertion, as do
NASA photos from the same period.
Even the actively flooded Omo delta did not undergo the destruction claimed by the GOE. The “raging waters”
described by the GOE to the media, for example, are fully contradicted by both Turkana and Dasanech ﬁshers’ accounts.
Dasanech and Turkana elders interviewed by this writer and other SONT researchers gave accounts of the 2006 flood and
those of prior years that are contrary to those of the GOE. SONT interviewed community elders from multiple locales in the
alleged ‘flood crisis’ zone, including: (i) the interior of the Omo delta, (ii) the west bank of the lowermost Omo River,
(iii) Todenyang/Lowarengak villages at the extreme northwestern Lake Turkana shoreline, (iv) the Ileret region at the
northeastern extreme of the lake, and (v) Ferguson’s Gulf (Fig. 1.3).
The Turkana and Dasanech elders consistently described annual Omo floods—and the 2006 flood in particular—in the
following terms:
• The August 2006 Omo River flood was extraordinarily large, but not destructive of human life and livestock as the GOE
had portrayed it. The impacts described by indigenous residents in the Omo delta and along the northernmost shores of
Lake Turkana (excluding those in the service of the government) consistently described the flood as “very large” but “not
destructive”—in fact, useful for their multiplicity of economic activities in ensuing months.5 The flood was not given a
special name by the Dasanech or the Turkana: a clear indication that they did not regard the flood as a ‘crisis’.
• Large proportions of both ethnic groups have recently been forced by their radically declining pastoral lives to relocate to
the river or the lake, where they have brought their remaining livestock for ‘last option’ grazing and watering and where
they have often taken up recession agriculture (along the Omo) or ﬁshing, or both. They share major dependence on the
annual Omo River flood whose inflow of freshwater sustains Lake Turkana and the ﬁshery upon which they depend for
their survival. The Dasanech term for ‘big Omo’ flood—war gudo‘ha’—is entirely positive for them.
The crisis that all riverside and northern lakeshore communities face is too little flooding, not excessive flooding. They
regard the Ethiopian government to have brought crisis to their area—not the Omo River.
Table 6.1 summarizes the flood history as reported to SONT by 25 Turkana and Dasanech elders from villages in the modern
delta region and along Lake Turkana’s northwestern shoreline, who universally described the loss of human life and
livestock during the 2006 flood as extremely small—ranging from 4 to 10 people lost and 5–90 cattle lost. Individual cases
of humans or cattle lives lost were well known among villagers,—underscoring these events as “special” or “news” to
villagers. When told of the GOE’s estimates of lost people and livestock, all informants were either angry or scoffed at such
accounts.
The 2006 flood waters were not even strong enough at the mouth of the Omo River to cause many ﬁshers to cease ﬁshing or
suffer damage to their nets and other equipment during the approximately ten day high flood waters. Villagers near the
river’s terminus at the lake—for example, at Lopelele—describe continued active ﬁshing by both Turkana and Dasanech at
the time. They also described the Ethio-Fisheries Corporation as remaining in the main channel for ﬁshing during the flood.
In other words, all three groups of ﬁshers continued their activity throughout the flood’s duration, while agriculturalists and
pastoralists moved laterally from the river to await its return to a lower level.
• Crops were submerged, but this was universally described as an exception from the predominant experience over many
years of Omo flooding, with success in recession agriculture when they were fortunate enough to receive ‘enough’ water.
5Individuals typically functioning in service to the government include church missionaries, both the Hiwot mission in Ethiopia and the Catholic
mission at Todenyang, Kenya. Both are ‘partnered’ or at least complicit with the GOE’s policies toward the indigenous communities and the
establishment of the dam enabled irrigated agriculture along the river. During Sont investigations, both missions were charging local residents for
payment of services—windmill use in the case of the Hiwot church and repair of church-installed wells (on traditional Turkana land), in the case of
the Catholic diocese.
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• One common account among residents was similar to that of one well-known Dasanech man considered to have a
problem, because of “two dead cows—one black adult cow and one calf.” The health clinics at Loyere and Toltale along
the Omo also took on water, with some boxes of medicines, biscuits and other materials carried away. “That is all,” local
elders stated.
• Residents reported that the GOE made a powerful show of force in military terms during the flood, particularly when
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister visited the area. Locals described the arrival of “many engine boats,” moving only a “few”
people who wanted to be transported. Villagers generally knew to move away from the river with their livestock during
floods. No reliable estimates exist for the population that actually moved, but elders estimate that no more than 6000–
8000 people were involved.
Villagers with social ties to villages along the Omo’s west bank moved there—especially to Attala, Kalama, Kipercheria,
and Bokom village areas.6 Other Dasanech in the delta went to the east bank of the river, including to Afor (Afewerk) and
Kapusie—locales south of Omorate where international observers were based. A small number of these new settlements
Fig. 6.2 Satellite images before and after the August 2006 Omo River flood. The photos indicate only limited areas of flooding near the Omo
River and Lake Turkana, not massive scale flooding as described by the GOE. Source U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
6Many of these Dasanech had to flee Atalago the following year, due to hostilities with the Turkana.
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Table 6.1 Recent Omo River flood history from a SONT 2009 survey of village elders
Elders interviewed were from Dasanech villages within the Omo delta and Turkana villages along Lake Turkana’s northwestern shoreline.
2009 survey of western omo delta and northwestern Turkana villagers regarding recent flood history (25 respondents) (Terminology used by
SONT interviewers and by respondents are retained in this table)
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were perpetuated after the flood. Some of the newly settled villagers were incorporated as ‘paid’ labor on government farms,
while others attempted to survive on their own or migrated back into the delta region or off to the east bank of the Omo.
Those Dasanech who moved out of the active delta region as the Omo waters rose planned to return to their replenished
lands when the waters subsided, as usual. However, many were blocked by the Ethiopian government from doing so.
Invalidity of the Ethiopian Government’s Downstream Impact Assessment
➢ A small selection of prominent statements in the GOE’s downstream impact assessment (GOE 2009b) illustrates the
major failures of the downstream assessment. These issues referenced here are addressed below.
(i) Seismic Risk.
GOE Statements:
•While the Gibe III dam is located in Ethiopia, in the vicinity (about 70 km) of the eastern branch of the East African rift
system the entire area interested in the project, according to the Level 1 Design Geological Report, doesn’t show any
evidences of present existing seismic activity.
• There are no conﬁrmed occurrences of geothermal activity in dam area and because of its distance from the major
Ethiopia seismic centres, located in the rift valley; any tectonical [sic] event will have negligible effects on the project
area.
False. Historical records and current geophysical information freely available in the public domain do not support
these statements. As Chap. 3 details, there is a 20 % chance of a 7 or 8 earthquake within the Gibe III dam region within the
next ﬁfty years, and there has been signiﬁcant seismic activity within the correct geographic unit of concern, as established
by international standards. Moreover, there is clear evidence that earthquakes of a magnitude greater than 5, accompanied by
a long series of foreshocks and aftershocks, have been related to reservoir impounding.
To repeat the statement by an ARWG geologist researching volcanics in river basins for several decades:
In the case of Vaiont, Italy, accelerated mass movement displaced water in the reservoir, the water overtopped the dam,
and a 226-foot wall of water drowned some 2600–3000 people downstream along the Piave River. Such an event in the
Omo would obviously affect a great many more people, most likely tens or hundreds of thousands of people.
(ii) ‘Elimination of Drought Risk’.
GOE Statements:
• The main beneﬁcial impacts of the Gibe III reservoir operation on the downstream hydrological regime are, therefore,
as follows: … Reduction of the extended drought periods (as the 1986–1987 ones). The [Gibe III] plant will allow the
complete regulation of the river flows reducing the highest peak floods and avoiding extended drought periods…
• [Artiﬁcial floods] nearby Lake Turkana will be similar therefore to the monthly average flows of August/September
during the dry years thus avoiding any critical drought event.
• Floods that occurred in 2006 (with return period of less than 10 years) caused destructive effects on human and
animal life, private assets and public infrastructure in the river delta, while the extended drought[s] period 1986–1987
originated a famine crisis for humans and wildlife. The [Gibe III] plant will allow the complete regulation of the river
flows reducing the highest peak floods and avoiding extended drought periods by means of: …The reservoir live
capacity of 12,300 mm3 (Comparable to the mean annual inflow volume of 13,800 mm3)…
• Increase in the Omo River’s flow volume during the dry season (by dam engineers, following the construction of the
dam), will alleviate the “severe drought” and associated overgrazing conditions in the lower basin.
False. Droughts are the result of lack of rainfall, not river flow volume. There is no causal relationship between volume
of river flow during the dry (or wet) season, on the one hand, and drought conditions within the extensive rangelands of the
lower Omo basin on the other. The EIA’s assertion that there would be a carefully regulated flow that would alleviate grazing
conditions is also unfounded. Overgrazing results from a complex of changes, including territorial restriction of indigenous
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groups, causing overcrowding of livestock. The reverse is overwhelmingly likely to occur: precipitous drop in river flow
would radically reduce available pasturage and browse near the river and force major overgrazing and even worse hunger
conditions throughout the region. The following chapters detail these issues.
(iii) Kenya’s Lake Turkana Level.
GOE statement:
The Gibe III dam will stabilize, not lower, the present level of Lake Turkana. No appreciable drop in lake level or
constitution will result from the dam’s construction.
False. Dam completion, reservoir ﬁlling and early dam operation, would produce a substantial drop in the level of
Lake Turkana—by ARWG scientists’ estimate, at least 7 m within 5 years—or about a 60 % reduction of flow
volume; higher estimates extend to anywhere from 10 to more than 20 m. A 2–4 m drop in the lake level, calculated
purely from the volume of water required for reservoir ﬁll, is improbable, in view of:
• The high frequency of ﬁssures in the basalts at the reservoir, with major potential seepage from the reservoir (which
would take decades or longer to reach Lake Turkana) and
• Major abstraction of water for planned large-scale irrigated commercial agriculture and industrial development.
(iv) ‘Excessive’ Flooding and Evaporation.
The GOE’s ESIA makes more than ﬁfty references to alleged repetitively occurring ‘destructive floods’, including the
supposedly ‘disastrous’ flood of 2006. Its statements include:
• Large and sudden floods (peak flows up to 5200 m3/s, return period 30 years, Gibe III site). Floods occurred in 2006 (with
return period of less than ten years) caused destructive effects on human and animal life, private assets and public
infrastructure in the river delta while the extended droughts [sic] period 1986–1987 originated a famine crisis for humans
and wildlife.
Huge evaporation losses as a consequence of excessive, uncontrolled flooding [of the Omo river] further contribute to the
current recession of Lake Turkana.
• Omo River overflow into the extensive adjacent floodplains, resulting in excessive evaporation, has caused the recent
drop in the level of Lake Turkana …and deprivation of vital waters for recessional cultivation.
• The Gibe III dam will provide for ‘recovery’ of these waters, thus compensating for much of the river flow volume
decrease during reservoir ﬁlling.
• The long-term beneﬁts [of the Gibe III dam] will include the reduction of the unproductive evaporation losses taking
place in the floodplains after the floods retreat. These losses largely exceed the expected total evaporation from the
proposed Gibe-3 reservoir.
• The Omo River, in fact, provides over 80 % of the lake water resources. By retaining the unproductive runoff surplus
of the extreme high-flow years in the reservoir, and releasing it in the extreme low-flow years, the dam will secure an
overall increased inflow to the Lake.
False. There is no ‘excessive flooding’ or ‘excessive evaporation’ in the ‘floodplains,’ as these broad mudflats are
relict, not active floodplains—thus, there are no such ‘beneﬁts’ of the Gibe III dam. There is no such cause of the recent
drop in the level of Lake Turkana, nor is there any ‘withholding’ of waters from cultivated lands. Flooding has never been
controlled, yet Lake Turkana has risen and fallen signiﬁcantly in the past ﬁfty years; the floodplain has played no role in the
lowering of Lake Turkana. The sharp drop in lake levels in recent years results from reduced precipitation in the large upper
Omo basin (more than 200,000 km2). As detailed in the next section, there has been only one major flood within the past
ﬁfty years—in 2006—and this flood was not a disaster for humans or livestock.
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(v) Indigenous ‘Rationality’ of Resource Use.
GOE statement:
In fact, technicalities and relevant characteristics, potentials and constraints of practiced Agriculture, Animal Hus-
bandry and Grazing, and Fisheries have evidentiated [sic]—a largely backward and primitive concept of land use, in
which natural resources are being utilized “at will” without much regard being paid to ensure any sustainability to
the utilization process, in most cases simply exploiting the resource to the best of individual capabilities, given the
numerous formidable constraints in terms of adverse environmental conditions in which human beings are forced to
dwell. [Emphasis added]
False. The indigenous communities in the lower Omo basin have evolved highly adaptive and effective strategies for
coping with some of the most difﬁcult environmental conditions on the earth. These strategies became increasingly more
difﬁcult to implement, as powerful colonial and post-colonial economic and political forces caused dispossession and
marginalization within the region. The above statement by the GOE reveals its extreme level of ignorance of the indigenous
socioeconomic systems where “at will” use of resources and “disregard of sustainability to the utilization process” are
completely antithetical to their centuries old traditional resource understanding and practice.
(vi) Riverine Forest and Forest Indigenous Livelihood.
The riverine forest in the lowermost portion of the Omo River is a critical settlement area and the source of livelihood
for thousands of indigenous peoples—primarily the Nyangatom, Kara and Dasanech (see Chap. 8). The GOE document
falsely represents the forest as: (i) “not of unique value, since [it is] the same as the highland riverine forest,” whereas
the lowland riverine forest is entirely distinct from the higher altitude forest system, and it is therefore signiﬁcant in
Ethiopia’s natural diversity; (ii) “stressed by overbank flooding by the Omo River,” when no such flooding occurs
upstream from the modern (active) Omo delta and its northern perimeter (Figs. 1 and 3), and (iii) beneﬁtting from
Gibe III regulation of the river. For example, it states:
The herbaceous stratum will also beneﬁt from more limited flooding, increasing its photosynthesis activity and
establishing itself on the river banks down to the river stabilized water level, thus contributing to limit riverbank
erosion and ﬁltering sediments reaching the river from the interior.
False. In reality, the opposite of all three assertions is true for this last pristine riverine forest in semi-arid Africa, with
its uniquely undisturbed vegetation and rich fauna, which would be destroyed by the Gibe III dam and associated
agricultural development. There is no evidence for overbank flooding, let alone ‘prolonged submersion’ of the forest. The
riverine forest is described earlier to include a complex flora and ecology described by this writer (Carr 1977, 1998, 2012)
and large fauna including leopard, elephant, buffalo, kuku, monitor lizards, at least three primate species and remarkably rich
bird life. Instead the forest and woodland vegetation is adapted to and depends on soil water retention during the Omo
River’s annual flood for its survival. Far from beneﬁtting, the forest would be destroyed by the elimination of annual Omo
high waters during the ‘flood’ period since the shallow rooted forest and woodland trees are wholly dependent on soil water
retention (termed ‘residence time’) in natural levee soils for their survival (see Chap. 8). With the destruction of this forest
environment, the livelihoods of thousands of riverine dwelling indigenous residents would be dismantled.
Table 6.2 summarizes key failures of the GOE downstream assessment (GOE 2009b) for the region most impacted by the
Gibe III.
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Table 6.2 Dimensions of invalidity of the Ethiopian government’s environmental and social impact assessment (GOE 2009b)
INVALIDITY OF ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT OF GIBE III DAM
IMPACTS ON TRANSBOUNDARY INDIGENOUS PEOPLES & ENVIRONMENTS
ASSESSMENT
COMPONENT
MAJOR ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT (GOE) ASSESSMENT FAILURES:
(Omission, Misrepresentation, Fabrication)





Full-scale disregard for transboundary social and environmental impacts of the Gibe III dam and associated irrigation
agricultural enterprises.
•Omission of impacts of Omo River radical flow reduction on more than 100,000 indigenous (including Nyangatom, 
Kara and Dasanech) livelihood systems along the lowermost Omo and within the modern Omo delta, as well as on the 
300,000 indigenous population living along Kenya's Lake Turkana in the transboundary zone. All face massive scale 
hunger, or starvation.
•Disregard for Kenyan sovereignty over Lake Turkana's northern shoreline zone and a significant portion of the Omo 
delta; expansion of the delta since the 1970s brought the Omo River terminus and much of the modern delta within 
Kenyan national borders.
•Omission of impacts on pastoralists of northern Kenyan and the Ilemi Triangle/South Sudan, due to loss of river-based
resources essential to their survival — particularly during prolonged drought periods.
•Omission of above changes causing major increase in cross-border interethnic armed conflict and destabilization, as
pastoral, agropastoral and fishing groups compete for disappearing riverine, lake and adjoining grassland resources.
2 Seismic Risk at the Gibe 
III dam: Earthquake, 
landslide, dam collapse 
threat.
Omission, Misrepresentation 
•Misrepresentation of appropriate geographic unit for seismic analysis (identified by U.N., Ethiopian, USGS and BGS   
seismic offices). False claims of "no serious threat," despite a 20 percent probability of a 7 or 8 (Mercalli) intensity 
earthquake in the Gibe III dam region within the next 50 years, and plausible dam disaster occurrence with
landslide events.  
•Omission of available data  (e.g., literature, satellite images) indicating frequent major seismic events in the Gibe III  
dam locality's geologically defined province. Dismissal of landslide danger, including potential danger of threat to  
the dam's integrity. ARWG geologists point to the steep rock faces of the reservoir walls in the gorge, additional  
landslide potential from saturation of the volcanic rocks, and seismically induced instability.
•Misrepresentation of sediment buildup danger as "not affecting the life capacity of the reservoir before 130 years," 
despite counter assessment that sediment accumulation capacity would reached within a few years, with dam failure.
3 Baseline data for Omo 
River downstream flow
volume & Omo River 
inflow to Lake Turkana.
Omission, Misrepresentation
•Failure to establish baseline data/measurements for Omo River downstream flow volume, with projections of 
'mean  flow,’ instead of direct measurement of Omo flow in the lowermost basin and the river's inflow to Lake 
Turkana.
•Invalid projections of existing river flow volume for both downstream zone and inflow to Lake Turkana — based on
incorrect/misrepresented data regarding precipitation and geomorphic characteristics of lower Omo basin, 
including: 
(i) Incorrectly identified precipitation regime for rainfall projections between the dam region and the lower Omo 
basin);
(ii) False representation of watercourses as Omo River 'tributaries' and thus  'alternative' sources of inflow prior 
to the main Omo channel, whereas these channels are not tributaries, as they dissipate prior to intersecting the 
Omo River (or Lake Turkana).      
(iii) Misrepresentation of the ephemeral Kibish River (Fig. 1.3) as flowing 
into Lake Turkana, whereas the Kibish dissipates in a large depression (Sanderson's Gulf) northwest of Lake
Turkana.
4
Impacts on Inflow from 
Omo River to Lake
Turkana:  reduction 
from Gibe III. 
Omission, Misrepresentation, Fabrication
•Misrepresentation of major components of Omo River inflow to Lake Turkana, based on above failures.
•Fabrication of extensive and repeated Omo flooding, with 'lost' waters otherwise available to sustain Lake Turkana
— whereas, in fact, these vast lands referred to are relict (ancient) floodplains not flooded for thousands of years. 
•Fabrication  (based on the above false assertion) of  'excessive evaporation' and vast floodwaters that are    
'recoverable' by river regulation (the Gibe III dam) — allegedly contributing to the sustainment of Lake Turkana. 
Since there are no such waters, there would be no such 'recovery' or sustainment. 
5
Excessive vs. insufficient
Omo River flooding re:
human life, livestock, 
and habitat.
Fabrication 
•Fabrication of frequent 'uncontrolled’ flood —' 'highly destructive' of human life and livestock. By GOE accounts,
360 to 900 people drowned, and more than 3000 livestock were destroyed in the 2006 flood. To the contrary, 
local  elders reported very little loss of human life through drowning (fewer than 10 people and fewer  
than 100 livestock, mostly those mired in mud). Satellite data supports local accounts of the 2006 flood. No
such destructive floods as described by the GOE are experienced by the region’s indigenous groups. 
•Residents throughout the lowermost Omo basin/modern Omo delta and northern Lake Turkana shoreline
region insist that the worst problem they face with the Omo River is too little flooding, rather than excessive
flooding. 
(continued)
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6 Projected Gibe III 
reservoir 'filling' period 
and factors impacts on 
downstream and Lake 
Turkana people and 
resources.
Omission, Misrepresentation 
•GOE exclusion of readily available geological literature and field-based information indicating highly fractured 
basalts and other volcanic rocks at the Gibe III dam/reservoir site — indicating a high probability of major water 
seepage from the reservoir into fractured rocks, with a major extension of 'filling' period, with sustained radically 
reduced Omo flow.
•Misrepresentation of water movement in the region - re: seepage water 'returning' to Lake Turkana "in any case" —
whereas the alleged 'migration' of seepage waters would require decades, if not a century or more. 
7




Omission, Misrepresentation, Fabrication 
•Omission of available information and investigation of the livelihood dynamics of indigenous groups in the lower 
Omo basin; total omission of information regarding indigenous residents around Kenya's Lake Turkana.1 The 
failed dimensions of assessment include: 
(i) The dynamics of pastoral, agropastoral and fishing livelihood systems.
(ii) The natural resource dependencies of these economies on Omo River and Lake Turkana waters (livestock 
raising, recession agriculture and fishing).
(iii) Recent changes in livelihood systems and the causes for these changes.
(iv) Current status (including malnutrition and disease) and key stresses on survival systems. 
(v) Exclusion of the content of available literature concerning the ethnic groups and economies in the lower Omo 
basin - including Turton, Carr, Almagor, Tornay and Abbink, among others. (Some of this literature is referenced 
in the GOE’s bibliography but its content is essentially excluded from consideration.) 
(vi) Overall extreme vulnerability of indigenous economies to the major resource losses predictable for the 
Gibe III dam.
•Omission of plans for GOE eviction of tens of thousands of indigenous residents along the lower Omo River in order 
to establish private and government irrigated commercial agriculture and major physical infrastructure (e.g., 
irrigation canals, commercial facilities). No account of the impacts of widespread expropriation, evictions  
and major infrastructure construction on indigenous survival systems within the lower Omo basin.  
•Omission of the impacts of large-scale irrigation agricultural development: to indefinitely prolong the radical 
reduction of Omo River flow volume and Omo River inflow to Lake Turkana, in turn causing major scale Lake 
Turkana retreat and destruction of its fisheries, along with Omo River channel incision and cessation of annual 
flooding of grazing and recession agricultural lands. 
•Fabricated Ethiopian government demographical data and other socioeconomic information incorporated into a 
report.2
•Fabrication of quantitative data for ethnic groups (demographic, livestock populations, other livelihood 
particulars). Quantitative projections from landsat/satellite materials with little if any bearing on actual conditions. 
•Fabrication of 'planned' agricultural and social development 'for' indigenous communities whereas, in fact, they are 




from the radical river
flow reduction
Omission, Misrepresentation
•Omission of all information regarding the direct dependence of lower Omo basin indigenous communities 
on flood recession agriculture — as well as information regarding the dependence of tens of thousands of other  
indigenous peoples on regional exchange relations involving agricultural produce, particularly as the pastoral
economies of all ethnic groups continue to decline.
•Failure to describe accurately the locations, cropping patterns, water requirements and other specifics of flood recession 
agricultural production, both along the Omo River's waterside flats and throughout much of the active Omo delta.
•As a consequence of the above failures, inability to establish any assessment of the impacts of radical Omo   
River flow reduction caused by the Gibe III dam and dam enabled irrigation on this mainstay food source.
Omission of flow reduction issue, northern shoreline retreat of Lake Turkana into Kenya and desiccation of the 
lowermost Omo flats and delta — thus eliminating flood recession agriculture in the lowermost Omo basin 
(and riverine zone last resort grazing for livestock).
•Fabrication of the practice of rainfed agriculture occurrence in the Lower Basin (this practice is not possible to have 








•Failure to detail and evaluate the importance of fishing - the last resort food source for tens of thousands of 
indigenous people in the lower Omo basin -primarily (but not only) among the Dasanech. Consequently, 
failure to establish a baseline for considering the impacts of the Gibe III on this pervasive and increasing form of 
livelihood. 
•Exclusion of bathymetric and other data (available, but shown by ARWG, the EIB and others to indicate that 
the Gibe III would cause southward migration of Lake Turkana's northern shoreline — at least a retreat of 10
kilometers, but likely substantially more due to major Omo water diversion for the GOE-promoted   
irrigated commercial agriculture). Critical fish reproductive habitat throughout the northern lake extremity
and delta locales would be destroyed, with elimination of the fishing livelihood as a means of survival throughout 
the lower Omo basin (with parallel destruction of fish dependent communities around Lake Turkana).
•Omission of the Ethiopian government subsidized private fishing corporations active in the lowermost Omo River, 
including the modern delta waters. Major piracy of Kenyan fisheries in Lake Turkana by the well-equipped and
aggressive commercial Ethiopian vessels — with the extraction of resources that are essential to both Dasanech 
and Turkana fishers and local residents.
•Disregard for artisanal fishing in Lake Turkana - the mainstay of survival for upwards of 200,000 indigenous
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10
Riverine forest & forest-
based survival activities
Omission, Misrepresentation, Fabrication
•Omission of available data regarding Omo riverine/forest ecology1 (e.g., Carr 1998) and comparative riverine  
environments where forest destruction has followed large hydrodam construction. 
•No apparent field-based investigation of lower Omo basin riverine forests. Erroneous description of the riverine 
and woodland vegetation along the lowermost Omo River.
•Disregard for the need to consider the Omo riverine forest structure and dependence on the river's flood regime -
thus its vulnerability to destruction from Gibe III development, as has occurred in all other Sub-Saharan Africa 
semi-arid environments with riverine forest development.
•Fabrication of overbank floods in riverine forests: no field evidence for such exists. In order to be sustained,
riverine forests require particular 'residence times' of water retention in natural levee soils during the Omo River’s
annual flood. 
•No account of livelihood activities in riverine forest (food gathering, hunting, and bee-keeping) critical to the 
survival of the most impoverished indigenous communities (Nyangatom, Dasanech and Kara) and tens of 
thousands of additional pastoralists who depend on riverine environments for their own and their herds' survival 
during prolonged drought. All would be eliminated by radical river flow volume reduction from the Gibe III dam.
•Omission of the GOE's major eviction of indigenous communities along the Omo River for clearing of the forest, 
construction of canal and irrigation systems and the establishment of large-scale commercial irrigation farms. 
11
Artificial flood:  
efficacy of GOE




Omission, Misrepresentation, Fabrication 
•Misrepresentation of GOE's 'planned' artificial flood program as calculated from adequate measures of downstream 
river flow volume and lake inflow, when no such measurements have been taken. 
•Misrepresentation of GOE 'planned' (but elsewhere disclaimed) artificial flooding — as "sufficient" to sustain 
downstream ecological systems as well as to mitigate problems that “might” occur for indigenous economies
as a consequence of sharply reduced river flow volume. Calculations used by the GOE to bolster its assertion of
effective mitigation are shown to be erroneous by the EIB, the Africa Resources Working Group (ARWG) and others.
•Omission of the fundamental conflict between the GOE's key objective — generating hydroelectric power 
at the Gibe III dam and that of releasing water to sustain downstream indigenous communities and their environments.
•Fabrication of a GOE plan to undertake controlled flooding along with agricultural development, for the 'benefit' of 
indigenous communities, whereas a GOE program of widespread eviction and privatization of indigenous lands, is 
well underway.
12
L. Turkana shoreline & 
littoral/nearshore zone 
impacts (physical, 
biological) of the Gibe 
III dam.
Omission, Misrepresentation
Omitted from any impact consideration, since GOE denies any significant impact will occur for the level of Lake Turkana 
from the Gibe III dam. 
13
Armed conflict and 
crisis in the 
transboundary region. 
Omission
While the GOE is fully engaged in trying to quell small scale but mounting armed conflict among ethnic groups in the 
broader region, and neither supports or permits various peace initiatives in the region, the GOE assessment indicates no 
cognizance whatsoever of the rising armed conflict, - conflict that would move to explosive proportions in a far broader 
region if the Gibe III is completed, since hundreds of thousands of indigenous people would be facing the devastation of 
their communities from the loss of the Omo River. The 2006 flood, rather than spreading beyond the active Omo delta,
extended only into the northern edges of the active delta and the basin-like depression west of the Omo River, known as 
Sanderson’s Gulf (referred to as berar by the Dasanech). The U.S. Department of Agriculture satellite photos (Fig. 6.2) 
substantiate this assertion, as do NASA photos from the same period.
Dasanech and Turkana male villagers strongly assert that — when faced with the deaths of their women, children, and 
youngsters to hunger and disease — they will fight for their survival.
Environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA)—additional study on downstream impact
aVillagers (Dasanech) throughout the west bank communities along the Omo River and within both middle and upper portions of the active Omo
delta reported to SONT researchers that no individuals from the government or other agency had interviewed or questioned them about their
resident populations, settlement patterns, livelihood activities (livestock raising, recession agriculture, ﬁshing activities), or their major resource
needs. Respondents described only police and government personnel taking action to move them or evict them altogether (with ‘employment’ of
only a few individuals), or government/‘outsider’ presence to investigate an instance of armed conflict, most frequently with the Turkana (or
Nyangatom)
bOne non-indigenous member of the governmental ofﬁce stated to this writer that he himself had ﬁlled out government questionnaire forms “for”
the local Dasanech population
cFor details of the lower Omo basin riverine forest/woodland floristics and vegetation (see Carr 1998); some summary characteristics are presented
below
Table 6.2 (continued)
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The False Promise of an Artificial Flood ‘Solution’
➢ The GOE’s stated plan to begin releasing reservoir waters annually as “artiﬁcial flood” (also termed “controlled
flood” or “simulated flood”) forms the centerpiece of its alleged ‘mitigation’ program following the operation of the
Gibe III dam (GOE 2009b), which the government acknowledges wouls cause a 60–70 % reduction of Omo River
flow volume. The gap between the rhetoric of the GOE’s publically announced program and the reality of its actual
intentions and the economic and political constraints on such a program, however, is extreme.
There is an effectively unblemished record of failure to implement artiﬁcial flood programs in major hydrodam
development within Sub-Saharan Africa, despite government and development agency assurances. These failures
include the Pongolapoort—one of the largest dams in South Africa, the Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique, the Iteshi Teshi
dam in Zambia, and the Manatali dam in Senegal. The Manatali Dam in Senegal is often cited as an exception to the rule of
failed artiﬁcial flood programs. But even it was short-lived and ended in failure.
Assurances by governments and development agencies of planned artiﬁcial flood programs are not difﬁcult to interpret, since
large dams have produced such an abysmal record of downstream problems for indigenous communities and non-indigenous
small-holders, as well as the environments upon which their livelihoods depend. Such promises of mitigation programs have
served as a cornerstone for the argument that although large dams are “flawed, they remain necessary” for economic
development within Africa and elsewhere in developing countries.
There are clear economic and reasons for the record of failure of these programs.
• For one thing, there is a clear contradiction between management of large dams for the maximization of power
generation, on the one hand, and management geared to sustaining downstream livelihoods and riverine envi-
ronments, on the other. This is evident enough in the case of Senegalese floodplain livelihoods that were sustained by
the river’s annual flood for centuries—until international ﬁnance and the Senegalese government constructed the
Manatali. A report to the World Bank described the severe impacts of the Manatali dam on the regional ecology,
agricultural production, ﬁsheries and public health in the downstream zone. The report, by Thomas and DiFrancesco
(2009) points out that inundating the floodplain below the dam:
…does require that some amount of power deliveries and revenues be foregone, as well as storage for irrigation
purposes in subsequent drier years.’ … ‘[Artiﬁcial] flood releases appear to have been provided only on those rare
occasions when they do not result in a reduction in power revenues or irrigation deliveries. They have occurred only
when the flood water could not be retained in storage in order to avoid the risks of overtopping the reservoir and creating
a safety hazard. [Emphasis added]
A newly formed agency, the OMVS (Organization pour la Mise en Valeurdu Fleuve Senegal), was charged with imple-
menting a downstream artiﬁcial flood. In order to provide the intended 2000 m3/s release of floodwaters (an amount double
that assured by the GOE for the GIBE III project). The Thomas and DiFrancesco report to the World also stated:
…the necessity to release water from the sluice gate and bypass the generator, requiring the OMVS members to forego
some amount of potential hydropower generation and revenues. Thus, there remains a serious economic constraint in
order to operationalize the Charter’s commitment to optimal annual artiﬁcial flood releases…As a consequence of these
enduring trade-offs, the Water Charter, and the Operational Manual do not [sic] guarantee that the artiﬁcial flood will
be provided in the magnitude and frequency that the floodplain needs…This decision is also likely to be influenced by
economic and political considerations.
[Emphasis added]
The massive scale capital outlays—typically, loans to be repaid, with interest and fees—necessitate maximizing ﬁnancial
return from dam operations. In Africa—especially in dryland regions—this objective is hardly met by prioritizing the
subsistence needs of pastoralists, agropastoralists and small-scale ﬁshers in the downstream zone, compared with providing
electricity for high energy demand industrial enterprises, whether agricultural, extractive or manufacturing.
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• Another key constraint on implementing an artiﬁcial flood program is that rainfall and its related conditions (erosion, land
use, etc.) pertains to the fact that catchment area upstream from major dams are major determinants of reservoir water
potential. Since these conditions fluctuate widely, and in the case of Ethiopia. are largely unpredictable, there is no
possible ‘guarantee’ of reservoir water release to serve the survival needs of downstream peoples and their environments.
Of many such instances, the Cahora Bassa dam situation provides a good example, as noted by Richard Beilfuss,
hydrologist and present CEO of the International Crane Foundation:
One of the big problems with the management of Cahora Bassa dam is that each year they need to create capacity to
store a possible large flood that could overtop the dam and so in order to do so they often have to release waters
during dry season. Especially in wet years, they have to release waters downstream to make storage capacity
available in the dam and in those dry season floods that have really been a terrible problem for farmers and ﬁshers
downstream because they can come at any time of the year. They can come in August or October and they can come
and wash out crops along the lower Zambezi. It’s quite a big problem, so not only is there the loss of floods during the
normal time of peak flooding - there’s also the potential for floods at any time of year.
➢ There is no evidence to suggest that the Ethiopian government would be the ﬁrst African nation to implement an
artiﬁcial flood program for a large dam—quite the contrary. GOE spokespeople themselves—including the Prime
Minister, EEPCO executives and the General Manager of Ethiopia’s Environmental Protection Authority—have asserted the
priority for electrical power generation in the “national interest.” Even by the most optimistic scenarios set forth by the
GOE, industry consultants and development agencies, such a program would not be feasible for a substantial number of
years, following reservoir ‘ﬁll.’ But there are direct GOE disclaimers, as well.
There are multiple disclaimers by the GOE of even its intention (or ability) to implement an extended artiﬁcial flooding
program in its downstream impact assessment (GOE 2009b). These statements are ignored in the 2010 EIB and the AFDB
assessments.
They include the following:
• In the event that the annual release is not being implemented as scheduled, some possible adverse impact may occur as
described below.
• Further desirable instruments have been considered and may be applied to both integrate the above main measures,
compensate in case planned artiﬁcial floods are partially withheld due to unforeseen circumstances, and as desirable
conﬁdence-building actions to strengthen support of local authorities and populations.
• Some of the potential interventions meant to offset possible negative impacts stemming from possible difﬁculties in fully
implementing designed controlled floods as planned.
• This may be necessary in case disruption of artiﬁcial floods may no longer fully contribute, by adequate submersion, to
the rejuvenation of grasses.
• In case the annual release does not fully succeed as scheduled, some other compensation measures could be imple-
mented including…conflict prevention and resolution training programs.
Beyond the electrical power allocated for marketing within the national grid system of Ethiopia, the GOE is bound by
contracts for power production for export, a system of contracting fully supported by the international development
banks. As detailed in Chap. 10, the banks and other key aid agencies are in fact engaged in funding the ‘energy highway’
system for energy transfer. Moreover, The 2010 EIB’s (conservative) estimate of a USD 10 million cost per annum for an
artiﬁcial flood program conflicts with Ethiopia’s contracts for export of power and its debt repayment obligations.
Even if the artiﬁcial flooding plan assured by the GOE were to be actually implemented, it would be wholly
inadequate to provide the flooding necessary for recession agricultural plots, riverside grazing habitat and sus-
tainment of the riverine forest—nor would it prevent or compensate for radical retreat of Lake Turkana (see
Chap. 5 and Fig. 5.2). These multi-dimensions of destruction would ensue from the outset of impoundment—a reality
asserted in the 2009 ARWG report and in Carr (2012).
Finally, GOE assurances that its plan for an artiﬁcial flood program would satisfy downstream environmental and
socioeconomic needs are based on a number of invalid assumptions and calculations. GOE assertions that: (i) its
projections are ‘analytical,’ (ii) “suitable environmental flow and controlled floods” have been arranged for, and (iii) “the
proposed river hydraulic model and outcomes of the Environmental Monitoring Plan will permit [sic] to optimize the
required controlled flow.” All of these assurances are baseless.
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The EIB stated in its ‘Independent Review’ that “the technical baseline for the estimation of the flood level is extremely
limited and further hydrological and hydraulic investigations are necessary…”. A similar point was made by the report
when it stated, “It is actually not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of such a mitigation measure without a scientiﬁc
detailed survey which will determine what is required to obtain successful results from flood recession cultivation.”
The GOE suggests a “suitable environmental flow” from which controlled flow calculations have been designed. According
to EEPCO, “The proposed river hydraulic model and outcomes of the Environmental Monitoring Plan will permit [it] to
optimize the required controlled flow.”
The value proposed is entirely inadequate for sustaining traditional artiﬁcial flood systems along the river’s waterside flats
and within the modern delta for the indigenous communities’ continued survival within the lowermost basin, as the EIB
consultant points out and ARWG physical scientists concur. The necessarily strongly increased ﬁgure would be would have
to be based on data not yet even collected or analyzed.
• Whatever artiﬁcial floodwaters the GOE would release from the reservoir would be highly compromised if not
entirely consumed by the large-scale irrigated agricultural enterprises downstream. Since the GOE downstream
assessment omits any account of these enterprises it is not possible to accurately assess the abstraction of waters that
would be required for the commercial operations but it is clear that this would be a massive removal of essential flow.
The EIB inadvertently makes this point in labeling the GOE’s planned releases from the dam wholly inadequate—even
though the bank assessment omits consideration of abstraction for the irrigated systems. It is striking that the EIB report,
like the 2010 AFDB assessment, ignores the GOE’s own disclaimers of a sustained artiﬁcial flood program (see below).
• Finally, artiﬁcial flooding even minimally sufﬁcient in order to sustain recession agriculture, grazing and ﬁsheries
locales downstream would likely be highly destructive for expensive and ﬁxed irrigation works along the lower
Omo River. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of large-scale irrigation systems are involved along the lower Omo River
are planned by the GOE—many of which are already under construction (see above chapters and Chap. 7). This point
was ﬁrst raised in the main text of the 2010 EIB assessment. This argument against substantial controlled flood releases is
partially responsible for the failure of implementation of ‘promised’ controlled floods in much of Africa.
In sum, the bare survival of hundreds of thousands of indigenous people would be destroyed—a crisis only worsened
by dam-dependent, irrigated agricultural enterprise abstraction of remaining Omo River flow. This major reality is
acknowledged by the EIB (2010) impact assessment, but only obscurely in the report’s text while omitted in its
Summary and Conclusion. These points are emphasized in the discussion of development bank assessments below.
Multilateral Development Banks and the ‘Complicity Treadmill’
➢ At its core, the relationship between multilateral development banks and the global consulting industry is one of
reciprocity. In return for basic compliance with development bank interests and parameters for impact assessment, global
industry consultants are rewarded with lucrative contracts and favorable status in future bidding processes. This enables the
development banks to maintain relationships with ‘reliable’ contractors for subsequent projects and simultaneously satisfy
their operational requirements for ‘open bidding’ and ‘arms length’ assessment. Meanwhile, the global consulting industry
ﬁrms and individuals concerned can maintain their professional standing as ‘independent’ analysts—even among many
non-governmental organizations critics and the concerned public.
This reciprocal relationship amounts to a ‘contract treadmill’ that can persist for decades. Chapter 1 describes much of the
basis for this treadmill emerging from the progression of institutions and political relations involved in river basin devel-
opment within Ethiopia.7 The connection between development banks, global industry consulting ﬁrms and individuals
involves both explicit and implicit agreements, or ‘understandings,’ regarding boundaries and approaches for impact
7Similar reciprocal relationships exist between executive ofﬁces of (African) states and major bilateral aid agencies, on the one hand, and global
consulting ﬁrms and individuals, on the other.
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assessment. Contract Terms of Reference, or ‘Scoping’ and ‘Bounding’ speciﬁcations, set parameters such as geographic
extent and emphasis on—or de facto exclusion of—particular environmental and socioeconomic impact dimensions in
assessments. Implicit ‘understandings’ are equally important in shaping of assessment content and conclusions, particularly
in capital-intensive projects such as river basin developments.
Together, these explicit and implicit directives lead to assessments by global consulting industry ﬁrms and individuals
that provide ‘complicity with comment’—lending credibility to the assessment process without fundamentally
questioning the projects in question.
Development bank and other policymakers rely on summary sections of assessments, including Executive Summary,
Conclusions, and Recommendations. It is commonplace that policy-makers and their staff policy ofﬁcers and their staff
only peruse main texts of assessments and key reports in order to conﬁrm their apparent ‘empirical’ character or for some
highly speciﬁc purpose. Consequently, brief mention or ‘notation’ of major problems embedded in the main text of
assessments, are seldom substantively considered. Even problems mentioned in the summary and conclusion sections are
easily passed over unless their signiﬁcance is prominently stated.
Global consulting industry representatives commonly downplay impact problems potentially severe enough to merit delay or
halt of the project at hand. Even the most destructive environmental and socioeconomic impacts predictable for a project are
frequently raised only as ‘suggestions’ for ‘further study’ or inclusion in alleged mitigation or monitoring efforts. Finally,
consultants acknowledge major impacts inconspicuously in the often highly technical text of assessments but omit or barely
mention in Conclusion or Executive Summary section.
These different means of minimizing negative impacts are pervasive in the GOE, EIB and AFDB assessments of the Gibe III
dam—as is the avoidance of the contentious issue of dam-enabled major irrigated agricultural enterprises planned, infor-
mation about which was fully accessible to the consultants.8
➢ The European Investment Bank and African Development Bank, while considering requests from GOE for Gibe III
project funding, each contracted long-established global industry consultants for ‘independent’ impact assessments of
the dam. The EIB extended a contract for a review (EIB 2010) of the GOE’s environmental and socioeconomic downstream
assessment—relating only to Ethiopia. The contract was awarded to the France-based global ﬁrm, Sogreah. For its part, the
AFDB limited (by its Terms of Reference) its impact assessment to Kenya’s Lake Turkana region, even though it had
previously funded the most recent Master Plan for the Omo basin (Woodroofe and Associates 1996). The AFDB contracted
for two separate impact assessments for the Lake Turkana region—the most notable of which was for the dam’s hydrological
impacts on the lake, including its water level and ﬁsheries (AFDB 2010).9 This contract was awarded to a former senior
manager and executive for 26 years with the Nairobi-based global ﬁrm, Gibb Africa.10 The second assessment was for the
dam’s socioeconomic impacts (AFDB 2009).
There was no apparent link between the AFDB’s environmental (Lake Turkana) and socioeconomic assessments, nor
between these assessments, on the one hand, and lake level drop caused by the Gibe III dam and linked developments, on the
other. The hydrological assessment (AFDB 2010) is by far the one referred to by government and development agencies.
However, the socioeconomic assessment has been largely ignored in policy statements and documents—likely for reasons
outlined below.
Both Sogreah and Gibb Africa (formerly, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners) had been engaged in Ethiopian river basin
development since the Awash Valley developments in the 1960s. As outlined in Chap. 2, both ﬁrms had received contracts
from international development bank and major bilateral agencies for river basin and related water resource development
projects that totaled hundreds of millions of dollars from major aid agencies.
8As the earlier sections of this chapter detail, ‘downplaying’ also occurs as straightforward falsiﬁcation and misrepresentation—both of which are
described above to be pervasive in the GOE’s assessment of downstream impacts (GOE 2009b).
9Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the AFDB assessment referred to below is the 2010 AFDB assessment of Gibe III impacts on the hydrological
conditions of Lake Turkana, rather than the 2009 AFDB socioeconomic assessment.
10Shortly before signing a contract with the AFDB for the hydrological assessment of the Gibe III dam, this consultant joined a new consulting
group of experienced individuals: Nairobi-based Water Resource Associates.
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The fragmentation of the Gibe III dam assessments into separate country approaches basically deﬁned away,
by simple Terms of Reference, consideration of the worst impact zone in terms of human lives at risk, namely,
the transboundary region.
➢ There are a number of shared failings of the EIB (2009) and AFDB (2010) assessments. Beyond the longstanding
contract history with development banks and other key aid agencies and the obvious limitations by Scoping agreement with
their client institutions, many of these failings can be traced to an uncritical view of GOE information and perspective or to
the reality that these assessments were primarily ‘desk studies’ with brief ﬁeld trips, rather than substantial ﬁeld-based
investigations.11 The key problems include:
• Failure to cite inadequate impact assessment parameters as deﬁned in their own Terms of Reference (or
Scoping/Bounding instructions) agreed upon with their respective clients—the EIB and AFDB.
• Failure to analyze the transboundary region, where the most intensive destruction of human life and environment by
the Gibe III dam and associated development would be inflicted.
• Discounting of the major seismic threat documented for the Gibe III dam geological province, despite available data
indicating a 20 % chance of a 7–8 magnitude earthquake within ﬁfty years, as detailed in Chap. 3. The EIB and AFDB
assessments do not challenge the GOE’s statements (nor those by the company constructing the Gibe III dam—the Salini
corporation) that no evidence exists for a signiﬁcant seismic threat to the Gibe III dam. Such statements are indefensible
by any scientiﬁc reckoning.
The EIB consultant’s response to the ARWG’s 2009 reporting of data in support of serious seismic threat in the dam region
—information expanded in this writer’s subsequent report (Carr 2012)—was simply stated as:
“Some risk cannot be avoided”.
The 2010 AFDB assessment referenced the EIB’s stance, with this added ‘suggestion’:
It would be sensible for the EIA studies to evaluate the consequence of a dam-break situation, especially as the dam is
being constructed in a seismically active zone and will store a massive volume of water equal to a depth of two meters
on Lake Turkana.
• Failure to challenge the Ethiopian government’s false assertions of ‘disasters and ‘uncontrolled flooding’ by the
Omo River, and particularly the GOE’s falsiﬁcation of catastrophic loss of human life and livestock. As described
earlier in this chapter, no such phenomena have occurred.12This major flaw in the assessments is closely related to the
their failure to address the GOE’s false assertions of “excessive evaporation” from overbank flooding by the Omo into
vast floodplains—evaporation of waters that the GOE maintained “contribute to the current recession of Lake Turkana,
and waters that would be “recovered” following the Gibe III dam, thus providing major water to Lake Turkana. In fact,
no such broad flooding of these lands occurs since they are ancient floodplains, as noted earlier.
• Acceptance of GOE and Salini (the Gibe III’s construction ﬁrm) assertions of a ‘brief’ reservoir ﬁlling period,
without risk of water seepage leakage from the reservoir (GOE 2009b).13 Without reference to available literature
contrary, the EIB consultant further contends that even if leakage from the reservoir were to occur, it would ‘migrate
back into the Omo basin’ and flow to Lake Turkana. Despite the obvious major importance of the issue for the hydrologic
impacts of the dam on Lake Turkana, the 2010 AFDB assessment concurs, stating:
11Like the 1996 AFDB-ﬁnanced Master Plan for the whole Omo basin and the AFDB-supported 1990 Master Plan for Ethiopia’s river basins in
total, the 2010 EIB and AFDB assessments are primarily document studies, with limited ﬁeld-based investigation The EIB, for example, reported
11 days ﬁeld investigation between the Gibe III dam site and the lowermost end of the Omo basin.
12The 2010 AFDB consultant later questioned GOE claims of such destruction in two publication for the African Studies Centre at Oxford (Avery
2012, 2013). This point had been made by the ARWG in 2009 and again in = Carr 2012.
13The GOE (2009a) notes that food aid will be required for just “two years”, when no flood will occur. No mention is made that adequate floods for
recession agricultural plots would cease.
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In 2009, the reservoir area had not yet been studied due to the challenges of access (Salini et al., 300 GEO RSP 002A,
2007). However, studies have since been reported, and Salini remain of the view that there are no appreciable losses
(Pers. Comm. Studio Pietrangeli, 2010). This view has not been disputed by others conducting reviews, such as
Sogreah (Sogreah, 2010), and if there are any losses, the topography dictates that the losses will feed back into the
Basin and will not be lost.
There is ample geological literature and observation in the Gibe III region (see Chap. 3) documenting the highly fractured
volcanic rocks, including basalts—conditions for strong leakage from the reservoir. Furthermore, statements of “no loss” of
even leaked waters because of movement back into the Omo basin are meaningless— certainly from the standpoint of human
life and ecological conditions in the lowermost basin and Lake Turkana. Seepage waters would require multiple decades—
perhaps centuries, according to ARWG geologists—to migrate the hundreds of kilometers to the lowermost basin and Lake
Turkana. This ‘re-balancing’ would obviously have no impact on the human devastation already having occurred.
• Agreement with the GOE’s (2009b) false statement that a lowering of Lake Turkana’s level by 1.8 m “during the
reservoir ﬁlling” period” would be “insigniﬁcant” since this decrease in lake level is “within the annual fluctuation
of the lake.”14 In fact, the drop in lake level would be in addition to, not within, whatever annual fluctuation occurs. Even
the ﬁrst two meters of lake level drop—with its corresponding cessation of Omo River flooding of vast areas along the
lowermost river and within the modern delta—would have disastrous impacts on the human communities already facing
major malnutrition and health crises.
➢ It is possible to cite speciﬁc EIB and AFDB (2010) assessment patterns that reflect the widespread practice of complicity on
the part of the global consulting industry (GCI) with their client government and development agency institutions. This
complicity takes some particularly common forms, partially noted above.15 They include:
• Agreeing to (sometimes even drafting) Terms of Reference (or Scoping) for assessments—terms that exclude consid-
eration of possible or even likely major human and environmental impacts: for example, impacts on resource accessi-
bility, local survival systems and preexisting livelihood stresses, as well as the critical matter of cumulative effects of
actions—in the case of the Gibe III dam, cumulative effects of the dam, irrigated commercial agriculture and the
hydroelectricity export transmission system.
• Offering ‘critical’ remarks regarding impacts of projects, but as suggestions for (optional) ‘future study,’ as ’consider-
ations’ for monitoring or mitigation of completed projects or other optional courses of action.
• Noting a destructive impact of major proportion without identifying its signiﬁcance or the necessity of resolving the
matter prior to inception or continuance of the project in question.
• Identifying serious, even life threatening or potentially disastrous impacts—in detailed or highly technical text within
reports or assessments, rather than in clear form in Conclusions. Summary or Recommendation sections.
Table 6.3 summarizes these and related patterns in the 2010 EIB and 2010 AFDB reports.
The EIB assessment presents a combination of content ranging from all-encompassing positive statements regarding the
‘beneﬁts’ of the Gibe III dam to the highly speciﬁc criticisms of GOE (2009b) methodologies. This statement in the report’s
summary, for example, exempliﬁes the overall positive evaluation of the project by the EIB consultant:
The ESIR Consultant considers the Gibe III project … to initiate the economic development of the Lower Omo, one of
the least developed regions of Ethiopia. It is recommended that any ﬁnancial support to Gibe III development is closely
linked to the simultaneous socio-economic development of the Lower Omo region, in order to maximize the beneﬁts
from the river flow regulation.
14“The ﬁrst ﬁlling of the Gibe III reservoir will have a limited incremental impact on the lake's natural water level fluctuations. It is expected that
there will be a lowering of the water level by about 1.8 m. This value is close to the annual fluctuations of water level in the lake, which is around
1.5 m, and well within the inter-annual fluctuations observed in the past (EIB 2010).”
15Between the two AFDB assessments, this failing is most evident in the 2009 socioeconomic assessment.
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The AFDB’s assessment of 2009, with Terms of Reference to identify the socioeconomic impacts of the Gibe III dam in the
Lake Turkana region, is rife with analytical misinformation, inconsistencies. This assessment fails to undertake a substantive
investigation of even the most basic aspects of pastoral, mixed pastoral/ﬁshing and ﬁshing livelihoods in the Turkana region,
let alone the potential impacts of the Gibe III dam—or its linked irrigated agricultural enterprises—on these systems. The
report blatantly asserts the Gibe III’s overall “beneﬁts” to residents in the lake region.
The EIB report identiﬁes at least eight major problems predictable from the Gibe III dam development, including the virtual
absence of baseline data for Omo River flow volume and river inflow to Lake Turkana, inadequate consultation with local
communities, and inadequate ‘compensation’ for residents of the lower Omo basin. However, the report stops short of
asserting that any of these are key issues necessitate resolution prior to continued dam building and operation (Table 6.3).
At least seventeen additional problems of signiﬁcance are identiﬁed, though inconspicuously, in the EIB report. Most
signiﬁcant among them are the following.
• Absence of a sound management plan and the failure to substantively evaluate ‘compensation’ for the region’s resident
population.
• Fundamental conflict between power generation at the Gibe III dam and the high opportunity cost of releases of water for
controlled flooding downstream.
• Likely occurrence of serious disease outbreaks downstream from the dam.
• Drying out of lands within the Omo delta and low riverside flats, where flood recession agriculture would be eliminated
(see below).
• An 8–10-km retreat of Lake Turkana’s northern shoreline—as a result of the radical reduction of Omo inflow to the lake
(Fig. 5.2).
• Possible violent conflict among ethnic groups within the Ilemi region.
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Information is based on summary sections of both reports (Executive Summary, conclusions, recommendations) in 2010 EIB and AFDB
assessments
aIn the case of the Gibe III dam impact assessments by the GOE, EIB and AFDB, all such efforts were initiated only well after project
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The EIB report fails to draw the obvious implications of such problems for the overall impact of the Gibe III project, even
when some of them clearly spell disaster for the resident population and the region’s environmental integrity. The main
exception to this pertains to the report’s recognition of the loss of recession agriculture, due to effects of the dam.
In the Lower Omo plain, the construction of the Gibe III dam will have signiﬁcant and direct impacts on the reduction
of cultivated land on the riverbanks and flooded areas (flood recession agriculture)…Approximately 67,600 people
depend to some extent on flood recession agriculture. (EIB 2010)
Even these statements are fully inconsistent with other assertions in the report. For example, the EIB apparently relies on
GOE ‘estimates’ and assertions of ‘limited indigenous reliance' on flood recession agriculture—therefore, limited vulner-
ability of the indigenous to livelihood systems to destruction from the Gibe III dam. The EIB quotes the GOE’s false
statement, shown below, without comment:
Only for Karo people where livestock is less signiﬁcant might recession agriculture constitute the main source of ivelihood.
[Emphasis added.]
In contradictory fashion, the EIB report references GOE estimates of 20,000 households within the delta that are practicing
flood recession agriculture (‘and cropping’), yet states elsewhere:
This means that 100,000 people could be affected in the delta alone.
For Dasanech communities along the Omo River, the loss of flood recession agriculture would have disastrous conse-
quences. Yet the EIB report repeatedly asserts that any loss of livelihood from elimination of flood recession agriculture
could be “compensated” or “offset” by rainfed agriculture—a patently false statement. Even brief conversation with
Dasanech residents or ecological ground reconnaissance in the lowermost basin and delta region would reveal—ﬁrstly, that
there is no ‘rainfed cropping’ in the region (in contrast with the Mursi region upstream), and secondly, that multiple
thousands of households depend on flood recession agriculture for their survival because their pastoral economy has been
dismantled in recent years.16
A dominant feature of the EIB assessment’s summary section is its inclusion of at least sixteen ‘suggestions’ for further
study or review—few if any of which have been carried out since the report was released. Some of these suggestions pertain
to impacts identiﬁed above; others are major issues that most critics would view as essential to resolve prior to concep-
tualizing the dam, and certainly before actually constructing and operating the dam. The EIB report suggests various studies
studies, including of Omo River flow volume and inflow to Lake Turkana, the technical feasibility of a controlled flood
program, livelihood development plans for the indigenous population, the socioeconomic and ecological character of the
delta, indigenous recession agricultural systems and riverine zone biodiversity. None of these are suggested as essential to
the planning or implementation of massive development in the basin, when the reality is that virtually all of them are.
Offsetting any such problems noted by the EIB are its assertions of ‘positive’ Gibe III dam outcomes for local
residents and for the ecology of the lower basin (Table 6.3). The report offers at least twenty-one positive statements
about the Gibe III project and its objectives, as well as GOE intentions and efforts to address local problems.17 The vast
majority of these statements are unfounded, and the likelihood of GOE adoption of the numerous mitigation ‘suggestions’ is
understood to be miniscule.
The EIB assessment repeats GOE’s assertions that its planned irrigation and canal works in the lowermost Omo basin will be
for “social development” projects—mainly, small-scale irrigated agriculture for pastoralists and distribution of social ser-
vices (GOE 2009b). The opposite was already occurring, however, even by the end of 2009 and early 2010—namely, the
expropriation of major resource and village areas along the river for the establishment of irrigated, large-scale government as
well as private farm enterprises. Desperation was already widespread, especially among the Dasanech.
16As detailed in Chap. 7, Dasanech villagers throughout the region consistently stated to South Omo/North Turkana (SONT) researchers that no
GOE or other individuals had been to their villages for information about household members and population, floods, recession agriculture or any
other activities.
17Although the GOE’s violations of EIB funding procedural requirements may well have raised a roadblock for the bank to fund the dam project
directly (a parallel situation with the AFDB and the World Bank), there are different interpretations as to why EIB funding did not actually
materialize. Whatever the decision of the EIB would have been, the Ethiopians reached an agreement with the Chinese for just under USD 500
million for construction (see Chap. 1).
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By comparison with the EIB, the AFDB has been far central in the rationalization of the Gibe III development, in
several regards. These include its ﬁnancial and technical support for::
(i) River basin development master plans and feasibility studies of dam and irrigated agricultural development in the
Gibe-Omo basin, from 1990 through 1996.
(ii) Impact assessments for the Gibe III project (2009/2010)—reports largely complicit with the development.
(iii) Financial support and legitimation of the major transmission line for exporting electricity Ethiopia to Kenya and the
broader eastern Africa region—a line including Gibe III electricity by all GOE accounts, despite AFDB and World
Bank disclaimers.
The development bank’s socioeconomic impact assessment (AFDB 2009) lacks an even minimally acceptable livelihood
description and analysis; various failings of the report are dealt with in Chap. 9. The AFDB socioeconomic consultants
apparently viewed their task as promoting the Gibe III dam project, as their own descriptions suggest. However, the
assessment does briefly note Turkana community opposition to the dam because of its likely destruction of the lake and its
ﬁshery—and even to threats of direct action by local leaders. Nevertheless, the consultants refer to their role as one of
emphasizing project ‘beneﬁts’ to local residents.
The AFDB 2010 hydrological assessment is the primary one referred to by GOE, development bank and other ofﬁcials. It
presents a largely complicit with the project. As indicated in Table 6.3, it generally states concerns as ‘suggestions’ for
studies or reviews, or as notations for possible monitoring or post-operational mitigation. The report’s major reservation
about the Gibe III dam project, stated only hypothetically, pertains to ‘possible’ irrigation schemes upstream. (As noted
earlier, the AFDB consultant produced two later reports for the African Studies Centre at the University of Oxford (Avery
2012, 2013) that took a far more critical view of the impacts of irrigated commercial agricultural development on Lake
Turkana—predicting, in fact, likely major destruction of the lake.
The 2010 hydrological assessment does identify some signiﬁcant problems with the GOE’s impact assessment of the
downstream Omo riverine zone within Ethiopia (GOE 2009b), such as in its statement, “Positive impacts on the lake’s
hydrology have been claimed, but there was no basis for these claims.” Other problems with the GOE’s assessment that are
identiﬁed in the AFDB report include: the absence of Omo flow volume and lake inflow baseline data—for which the AFDB
review lays out an alternative method of calculation; predictable Omo River incision and water table drop, sediment capture
and buildup at the dam, and impact of flood regime changes on ﬁsh breeding in the lake.18
Beyond the deﬁciencies identiﬁed above as in common for the AFDB and EIB reports, other major problems exist in the
2010 AFDB hydrological assessment.
(i) Rather than recognizing the transboundary character of the Omo River itself, with its terminus within Kenya’s
national borders (Figs. 1.2 and 1.3), the AFDB report repeatedly asserts the river to be only within Ethiopia. For
example, the Executive Summary states:
The lake is almost entirely within Kenya, whereas the Omo River is entirely within Ethiopia.
Rather than acknowledge the transboundary nature of the Omo River itself, the AFDB report asserts only that the
effects of reduced flow (unspeciﬁed as caused by the dam or irrigation) would impact Kenya, so that “management of
the Omo Basin and lake water resources presents transboundary challenges”—presumably with management tech-
niques after dam operations have been launched.
18A prediction of Lake Turkana’s likely drop in level during and following the Gibe III reservoir-ﬁll, by an ARWG physical scientist long familiar
with the regioni, is presented in Chap. 5 and subsequent chapters.
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The matter of the Omo’s terminus with Kenya, making it an international river, is obviously of major political
signiﬁcance in any economic development affecting the river’s delivery of water to neighboring countries and must be
negotiated with those countries’ governments—prior to project approval or inception. This point reflects both
international principles and Ethiopian regulations. The AFDB assessment skirts any explicit recognition of this
reality.19
(ii) Nearly all of the concerns raised in the 2010 AFDB assessment summary sections take the form of ‘suggestions’
for further study or review, mitigation or monitoring, as (Table 6.3) indicates. Many of the 19 studies or reviews
that are suggested in AFDB summary sections involve issues that most analysts would consider fundamental to even a
minimally adequate impact analysis. These require resolution prior to the project’s undertaking. Because the dam was
already under construction for nearly three years by the time the AFDB assessment was produced, such suggestions
clearly remain discretionary on the part of project developers and they presumably were meant to be undertaken during
or after project completion and operation (see Table 6.3). For example, studies or reviews are suggested for bathy-
metric studies of the lake, hydrologic measurement, flooding patterns of the river, irrigation utilization of the river,
ﬁsheries status of the lake, calculation of the ‘economic value’ of the lake, socioeconomic studies, and ‘integrated basin
environmental and socioeconomic assessment,’ and dam ‘breakage.’
(iii) The AFDB 2010 assessment fails to deal with the predictable 8–10-km retreat of Lake Turkana’s northern
shoreline during Gibe III reservoir ﬁlling period (EIB 2010) and the consequences of this retreat for major ﬁsh
reproductive habitats there. Such radical change spells disaster for hundreds of thousands of Dasanech and Turkana
residents who depend on the northern lake’s resources for their survival. The absence of the AFDB report’s consid-
eration of such a retreat is particularly disturbing in view of its recognition of the importance of the Omo’s annual flood
pulse of fresh water, sediment and nutrient input to the northern end of the lake.
(iv) The AFDB assessment erroneously and repeatedly describes the extensive irrigation agriculture development
along the Omo River as a separate phenomenon from the Gibe III dam. The fundamental dependence of the
irrigated farms on the Gibe III dam’s regulation of the Omo River is essentially denied, or downplayed, as evidenced
by these statements:
“This hydrological study has demonstrated that with the potential abstractions that might be implemented, the lake
could drop up to 20 m. This is not attributable to Gibe III...” [Emphasis added.] “Irrigation abstraction is not a
project component of the Gibe III project, as the dam is developed solely to generate power, but indirectly, the
regulated flow sequence from the dam is expected to stimulate small-scale irrigation”. [Emphasis added.]
While the latter statement is technically accurate, it omits the reality that the dam’s hydroelectric potential and the Omo
Valley’s possible irrigation agriculture, including large-scale commercial operations—were long considered integrally by
development interests.
The 2010 EIB impact report references GOE information (see below) regarding irrigation plans in its consideration of
irrigation feasibility potential in the lower basin, and report includes a GOE map indicating major irrigation areas planned
(see chap. 7). The GOE has openly solicited international agribusiness and related industrial investment in the Omo basin
prior to and during preparation of the EIB and AFDB assessments.
Since feasibility studies and planning (even some construction) of large-scale irrigation infrastructure were undertaken well
before the AFDB assessment and were, in fact, referred to by its author, planning for both the hydroelectric dam and its
linked irrigated agricultural enterprises was certainly known to the AFDB consultant.
19The AFDB does quote, but without comment, the 1996 Master Plan for the Gibe-Omo river basin: “…This means that in the international context
a bilateral agreement should be reached between the two countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) before either country changes the natural flow of the
river…Any major change in the river’s regime as, for instance, by the construction of a dam for the development of hydro-power, or, more
signiﬁcantly, by the development of large-scale irrigation in the south of the basin, would be almost certain to raise issues internationally…”.
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The development banks had actually supported various aspects of planning for river regulation and large-scale irrigated
agriculture in Ethiopian river basins for decades. In the case of the AFDB, the bank had directly funded two desk studies of
major policy importance. One of these was the 1990 Master Plan for all Ethiopian river basins, prepared by the global
consulting ﬁrm, WAPCOS (see Chap. 2). The other—contracted to Woodroofe and Associates a few years later for USD 6.1
million—was the 1996 Master Plan for the Gibe-Omo River Basin, which estimated both the basin’s potential hydrodam
electricity and irrigation agricultural development.
The GOE’s 2009 downstream impact assessment formulated three types of irrigation:
• Small-scale ‘settlement’ agriculture,
• Small-scale commercial irrigated farms, and
• Large-scale irrigation farms—i.e., over 7200 ha (cotton and sugarcane plantations).
Two additional statements within the AFDB 2010 impact assessment are sufﬁcient to illustrate the report’s failure to link
the Gibe III dam and major irrigation systems and to directly address the seriousness of the combined dam-irrigation effects
on the indigenous population.
“If irrigation development proceeds as planned in the Omo Basin, the lake will diminish, as will biomass and ﬁsheries.
Whether this is of consequence should be the subject of a separate study and consultations with the Kenyan
Government and stakeholders, and should be based on a proper economic evaluation of Lake Turkana and its
resources.” [Emphasis added.]
“The biggest impacts can be expected to arise from Ethiopian Government plans for large scale irrigation within the
Basin. These have not been studied in this Report, but they must be taken into account at some point, as it will be futile
to disregard developments in the Basin as a whole as they affect mitigation measures. As developments are inevitable
to cope with rising population pressure and food security needs, a balanced view needs to be agreed upon between
Kenya and Ethiopia, through detailed studies and dialogue, on what environmental impact is acceptable, and on what
mitigation measures can be adopted, and how they will be managed. This process has already begun.” [Emphasis
added.]
In reality, major scale irrigated agricultural enterprises planned or under construction downstream from the
Gibe III dam are clearly dam enabled enterprises, not ‘unrelated’ phenomena. Among numerous linkages are these
closely related ones:
• Large irrigation systems, commonly for monocrops and high chemical use—require predictability of water and cali-
bration of cropping phases—predictability that can only be provided by regulation of the river flow volume and its
periodicity.
• Irrigation infrastructure cannot accommodate wide fluctuations of the river’s natural state.
Linkages between river regulation by major dam construction and large-scale irrigated agricultural enterprises are
well-documented in developmental policy and economic and scientiﬁc literature concerning drylands Africa. They have
been in play throughout the decades of ‘modern’ Ethiopian river basin development, beginning with that nation’s ﬁrst
irrigated agricultural schemes and major (at the time) dam development—in the Awash Valley.
Since large-scale irrigated agricultural development along the lower Omo River is dependent on the river’s regulation
by the Gibe III dam, these two developments have a causative connection. This matter is discussed in Chap. 10, along
with the critical matter of human rights violations being committed.
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